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The duration of spells of lone motherhood has important consequences for the economic 
well being of the members of such families and the cost of social programs.  We use a 
large sample of linked income tax records to estimate a competing risk model of the 
impact of welfare benefits, language group, and other demographic characteristics on the 
likelihood of an exit to both marital and common law unions.  We also consider the 
economic consequences of exits from motherhood to such unions.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Social policy makers and researchers in Canada have devoted considerable attention to lone 
mother families. In the 2001 Census, lone mother families account for 15 percent of all Canadian 
families with dependent children and were among the most economically vulnerable in society.  
For example, 53% of lone mother families had low income as opposed to 11% of couples with 
children.  The low-income spells of lone mothers also tend to be longer and deeper than those of 
two-parent families (National Council of Welfare 2001 and Finnie and Sweetman 2003).  Dooley 
(1999) examines the extensive welfare participation of Canadian lone mothers. Because of the 
hardships they suffer, their draw on public resources, the potential handicaps their children face, 
and other related issues, lone mother families, especially those in low income, remain high on the 
research agenda. 
 One important dimension of lone motherhood that has received very little attention in the 
Canadian research literature, however, is the length of time spent in that status.  The duration of 
spells of lone motherhood has important consequences for the economic well being of the 
members of those families and the cost of social programs.  We are aware of only three Canadian 
papers (Desrosiers and Le Bourdais 1993, Le Bourdais, Desrosiers and LaPlante 1995, Lefebvre 
and Merrigan 1998) that examine the duration of spells of lone motherhood and only the last of 
these explicitly considers the impact of welfare policy variables.  These studies are based on 
relatively small samples of data that are retrospective in nature rather than longitudinal and, even 
more importantly, are now at least fifteen years old.   
The 1990’s witnessed important changes in welfare policy and related income support 
programs in most provinces and at the federal level, most importantly the National Child Benefit  
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Supplement.  The principal goals of these reforms were to lessen reliance on welfare and 
strengthen labor force attachment.  Canadian welfare caseloads have dropped dramatically and 
there is evidence that policy reforms have played a role in this process (Finnie, Irvine and 
Sceviour 2004).  The impact of these policy changes on the length of lone motherhood spells has 
yet to be examined and the first objective of this paper is to estimate this impact using a sample of 
linked income tax records from the Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD) for the period 
1982 through 2000.   
A second objective of the paper is to extend the Canadian literature on lone motherhood 
spells not just in terms of their duration but also in terms of the relevant exit states.   Common-
law unions have become increasingly important especially in Quebec. In 1981, 7% of all couples 
in Quebec and 5% of all couples in the rest of Canada were living in common-law unions.  By 
2001, these proportions were 30% in Quebec and 12% in the rest of Canada.  In 1971-73, the 
proportion of births occurring within common-law unions was 4% in Quebec and 3% in the rest 
of Canada.  By 1997-98, this proportion had grown to 46% in Quebec and 15% in the rest of 
Canada (Le Bourdais and Lapierre-Adamcyk 2004).   (The proportions of births outside of any 
union grew from 6-7% to 9-10% in both areas.)   
No Canadian study, however, has either estimated a competing risk model of the exit from 
lone motherhood to different kinds of unions or examined the economic consequences of exits to 
these different states.  Such a study is of interest for at least two reasons.  First, the impact of 
various explanatory variables, such as the level of welfare benefits, on the likelihood of an exit 
from lone motherhood may differ substantially with respect to the specific state to which the 
person exits. Second, the consequences of an exit, both economic and otherwise, may vary with 
the exit state.   In this regard, several Canadian studies have demonstrated that an exit from lone  
  3
motherhood usually lowers the proportion of mothers and children with low income and on 
welfare, but differences by exit state and language group have not been analyzed to our 
knowledge (Finnie and Sweetman 2003, Picot, Zyblock and Piper 1999).   
Unlike most sources of longitudinal data, the LAD provides a sample of spells of lone 
motherhood sufficiently large to provide answers to the following questions among others.  Does 
the likelihood of an exit differ by the exit state?  Does the impact of welfare benefit levels or 
other variables, such as the age of mother and children, on the exit rate from lone motherhood 
vary by exit state?  Is there evidence of changes during the 1990’s in the exit rates to different 
states?  Are there differences in the exit rates to different states between lone mothers in 
provinces with different histories of welfare reform or between lone mothers in Francophone 
Quebec versus the rest of Canada?  Do the economic consequences of an exit from lone 
motherhood vary by exit state and/or language group? 
The next section of the paper contains a brief review of the literature. Our data, methods, 
descriptive statistics and empirical hazard functions are discussed next followed by estimates of 




There are three published Canadian studies of the length of lone motherhood spells.  Desrosiers 
and Le Bourdais (1993) use retrospective family-history data from the 1984 Canadian Family 
History Survey to construct empirical hazard and survival functions.  They report that the 
likelihood of an exit declines with the length of the spell. One-sixth of all spells in their sample 
last less than a year but one-third last more than ten years.   
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Proportional hazard models are estimated by Le Bourdais, Desrosiers and LaPlante (1995) 
using the 1984 Canadian Family History Survey and by Lefebvre and Merrigan (1998) using 
retrospective family-history data from the 1990 General Social Survey.  In both papers, there is a 
single exit state to a union, either marital or common-law.  (Lone motherhood spells which 
terminate for other reasons, most commonly the aging of dependent children, are censored.)     
Both papers report that the likelihood of an exit declines with the mother’s age, increases with the 
age of the youngest child, and is higher for lone mothers who were single prior to lone 
motherhood (henceforth “previously single”) than for those who were previously married or 
common-law.  (Throughout this paper, we will use the term “married” to refer to a registered as 
opposed to a common-law union.)  Among the previously married or common-law, there is no 
difference between the separated/divorced and widowed in the likelihood of an exit once one 
controls for the mother’s age.  LeBourdais et al. report an increase over time in exit rates, 
whereas Lefebvre and Merrigan, using a more recent data set, report no such secular trend.     
LeBourdais et al. also report very weak positive effects of the mother’s education and numbers of 
children on the hazard rate whereas Lefebvre and Merrigan find strongly negative effects of both 
variables.  
Only Lefebvre and Merrigan include the level of welfare benefits in each province for a 
lone-parent family and for a two-parent family in their model.  In the case of previously single 
lone mothers, higher benefits for single parent (two-parent) families are associated with longer 
(shorter) spells of lone motherhood.  This is not true, however, in the case of previously married 
or common-law lone mothers.  This finding of a significant effect of welfare benefits contrasts 
with the two other principal Canadian studies of the relationship between welfare benefits and 
marital status.  In an earlier paper also using the 1990 General Social Survey, Lefebvre and  
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Merrigan  (1997) find no significant effect of the level of welfare benefits for lone parents on the 
likelihood of dissolution for marital or common-law unions. The level of welfare benefits for two 
parent families was not included in that study.   
Dooley et al. (2000) use a time-series of cross-sections from the Survey of Consumer 
Finances to analyze the relationship between welfare benefits and the likelihood that a woman is 
a lone mother. With such data, the multivariate coefficients reflect the impact of the independent 
variables on both the likelihood of starting a spell of lone motherhood (incidence) and the length 
of the spell (duration).  These authors find no significant effect for the welfare benefits of either a 
single parent or a couple.  Hence, the principal Canadian support for a relationship between 
welfare benefits and marital status comes from Lefebvre and Merrigan’s (1998) finding for the 
duration of lone mother spells among the previously single.   
 
THE DATA AND EMPIRICAL HAZARD RATES 
 
The LAD Database and Estimation Sample 
 
The Longitudinal Administrative Database (LAD) is a Statistics Canada database 
developed from personal income tax information as well as other administrative information 
regarding nontaxable transfer payments. Unlike surveys such as the Survey of Labour and 
Income Dynamics (SLID), the LAD lacks specific information on many socioeconomic variables 
such as education and hours of paid work. However, the LAD has the clear advantage of 
enormous sample size (currently with almost 4.7 million records per year, a 20% sample of all tax 
filers) in a longitudinal structure that is updated annually. It also contains highly detailed data  
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concerning the level and sources of annual income. Inaccuracy may arise in the LAD due to the 
incentive of some tax filers to misrepresent their income to the tax authorities. It is not clear, 
however, that there is more misrepresentation to the tax authorities than to surveyors given that 
the legal penalties are substantial for the former and nonexistent for the latter. Furthermore, recall 
error is likely much less common in the LAD due to the information system that assists accurate 
responses (T4 slips and the like) and the linkages of the LAD to administrative records for 
payments such as the Canadian Child Tax Benefit.  
We use data from the LAD for the ten provinces and the years 1982 through 2000.  We 
first restricted the LAD sample to women age 18 through 54, an age range which contains over 
95% of Canadian lone mothers with children under age 18 in the Survey of Consumer Finances 
(Dooley 1999). Our next step was to categorize these women into one of the following family 
types in each year: lone mother, married with children, living common-law with children, married 
or living common-law with no children, unattached, and “filing child”.  The Appendix provides a 
detailed description of this categorization process. A lone mother is defined as a woman who has 
a child under 18 and is neither married nor living common-law. In the definitions of married with 
children and living common-law with children, the phrase “with children” refers to children 
under 18.  A filing child is an individual age 18 or more who has filed using their parents as the 
home address and who is neither married nor living common-law, lives with one or both parents, 
and has no dependents.   
We use lower-case “t” to refer to the year of entry into lone motherhood and upper-case 
“T” to refer to the year of exit from lone motherhood. A spell of lone motherhood starts when a 
woman is of a family type other than lone parent at the end of t-1 and is a lone parent at the end 
of year t.  (Demographic information on tax forms refer to the end of the calendar year).  Hence, t  
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is a transition year and t+1 is the first full year in which we observe the woman as a lone mother. 
A spell of lone motherhood ends when a woman is a lone parent at the end of T-1 and some 
family type other than lone parent at the end of year T.  Hence, T is a transition year and T+1 is 
the first full year in which we observe the woman after a spell of lone motherhood. 
  In order to minimize the mis-measurement of spells of lone motherhood, we imposed a 
series of criteria, which are again described in the Appendix, for determining valid entries into 
and exits from this status.  Most importantly, we require that we observe a woman for two years 
prior to, and for two years after, the start of a spell of lone motherhood (year “t”) in order to 
assess accurately her family type prior to lone motherhood and to eliminate sequences of very 
short spells of lone motherhood that may be due to mis-measurement. Short spells of lone 
motherhood are permitted in our samples.  We simply require the minimum five year “window” 
to ensure that any short spell of lone motherhood is consistent with the woman’s status over a 
longer sequence of years.  The implication of this criterion is that the earliest year “t” in our data 
is 1984 and the latest is 1998.   
  For several reasons, we are confident that our LAD sample is representative of all 
Canadian lone mother spells.  First, the number of lone mother families in our LAD sample in 
any given year is between 102 and 110 percent of the estimated number of lone mothers found in 
the Survey of Consumer Finances (Dooley 1999 and further estimates made for this study) and 
this difference is smallest in the recent years.   Second, a return to a former partner occurs in 27% 
of LAD exits to a marital or common-law union with children, a figure which is very close to the 
estimate of 29% reported by Juby, LeBourdais and Marcil-Gratton (2005) who use the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth to provide the only other Canadian study of this  
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question of which we are aware. Third, the general pattern of our empirical hazard and survival 
functions reported below are similar to those found in previous studies with survey data. 
We do not have a complete marital history for individuals in the LAD and, therefore, 
cannot limit the estimation sample to first spells of lone motherhood as did LeBourdais et al. 
(1995) and Lefebvre and Merrigan (1998).  We do, however, allow a woman to have multiple 
spells of lone motherhood over the period covered, but only 6.8 % and 0.2% of the total sample 
spells are second and third spells respectively.  Controls for the order of spell had no substantive 
impact on our multivariate estimates.  
As indicated above, the spells in our sample can have a start year “t” as early as 1984.  For 
three reasons, however, we have considered only exits (“T”) from the year 1993 or after.  The 
first two of these reasons reflect important changes in the 1992 federal tax form.  This was the 
first year in which individuals could self-identify as living in a “common-law union”.  In 1991 
and earlier years, the LAD identifies common-law status solely by means of algorithms that have 
been developed at Statistics Canada based on address matches, individuals’ names and ages, and 
the identification of other individuals resident at the same address. (See the Appendix for a more 
detailed discussion.)  Nineteen ninety-two was also the first year in which social assistance 
income was reported on federal tax forms, and some of our models control for the presence and 
level of income from this and other sources of income.  The third reason is that we believe our 
data for provincial welfare benefit levels to be most accurate for the period 1992 and beyond.  
As a sensitivity check, we estimated our models with a sample of lone mother spells 
limited to those that also started in 1992 or after.  This produced no substantive differences in our 
findings and, hence, Tables 2 and 3 contain estimates obtained with spells starting as early as  
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1984 in order to be able to present hazard rate estimates for spells of length greater than eight 
years.  
 
Empirical Hazard and Survival Rates  
 
Figure 1 shows the empirical hazard and survival rates for Canada as a whole.  The likelihood of 
an exit in year 1 of the spell is 17%, leaving 83% of the original cohort surviving in the status of 
lone motherhood. The hazard rate falls to 15% in year 2, and the survival rate to 70%. The overall 
hazard rate declines somewhat as the spell lengthens, but turns up beyond year 10 (see below for 
an explanation). The survival function shows that about one-sixth of all spells last only one year 
(as also found by Desrosiers and Le Bourdais) but that only one-fifth last more than 10 years 
(which is less than the one-third figure found in that previous study).  
Figure 2 shows that the shape of the hazard function depends on the type of exit, which is 
a question not considered in previous Canadian studies.  The exit rate to “married with children” 
starts at 7% and declines thereafter. The exit rate to “common-law with children”, in contrast, has 
a non-monotonic pattern with an average value of 6%-7% in the first six years of the spell and 
declines steadily thereafter.  After year 1 of the spell, an exit to a common-law union is thus more 
likely than an exit to marriage. (Of course, some of these common-law unions will eventually 
result in registered marriages.)  In results not shown here, the combined hazard of an exit to any 
union, either marital or common-law, declines steadily from 13% to 4% between year 1 and year 
13 of a spell.   
Figure 2 also shows that the hazard of an exit to “single with no children under 18” is 
either stable or increases very gradually during the first 10 years, but rises noticeably thereafter.   
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The increase in this hazard rate beyond year 10 reflects the fact that most of these exits are due to 
the aging of the youngest child from age 17 to 18 (results not shown here) rather than to a 
departure of a child under 18 from the household.   Finally, the hazard of an exit to the status of 
married or common-law with no children is very small and stable across virtually all spell years.   
As discussed in the Introduction, Francophones in Quebec are more likely than other 
Canadians to live in, and have children in, common-law unions as opposed to registered 
marriages.  This difference has not been examined, to our knowledge, in the context of exits from 
spells of lone motherhood.  The LAD identifies language group as that used on the tax forms.  
Ninety per cent of federal tax forms in Quebec are filed in French and 10% in English.  Outside 
of Quebec, the proportions are 98% English and 2% French.  In survey data, substantial numbers 
of Canadians identify neither French nor English as “first language” or “language used at home” 
(Statistics Canada 2004).  We take language used on the tax form as a signal of the official 
language of Canada with which the individual is most comfortable or to which she has greatest 
ease of access.  
Figure 3 provides the hazard rates to marital and common-law unions for all of Canada 
other than Francophone Quebec (NOTFQ) and for Francophone Quebec (FQ).  In any given spell 
year, the probability of an exit to married with children is indeed higher in NOTFQ than in FQ 
and the reverse is true for the probability of an exit to common-law with children.  Even in 
NOTFQ, however, an exit to marriage is more likely than an exit to common-law only in the first 
year of the spell.  The latter, therefore, is the more common exit type for either group.   
Figure 4 shows that the combined likelihood of an exit to either a marital or common-law 
union (that is, the combined exit states) is very similar in NOTFQ and FQ.  This finding supports 
the claim made by Le Bourdais and Lapierre-Adamcyk (2004) that Francophone Quebec and the  
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rest of Canada differ in the type of union chosen but not in the propensity to live in a union.   
Table 1 shows that the differences between language groups noted in Figure 3 are also 
true conditional on marital status prior to lone motherhood.  In each panel in Table 1, exit rates to 
marriage are always larger in NOTFQ than in FQ and the opposite is almost always true for exit 
rates to common-law unions.  For each prior marital status, however, NOTFQ and FQ have 
similar combined exit rates to either type of union.  Finally, an exit to a common-law union is 
usually more likely than an exit to marriage regardless of prior marital status.   
Table 1 also shows, however, that prior marital status per se matters, as reported by 
LeBourdais et al. and Lefebvre and Merrigan (though not by language group). Within each 
language group, the exit rate to marriage is larger among the previously married than among the 
previously common-law, and the reverse is true for the exit rate to common-law unions.  Table 1 
also indicates that the exit rate to marriage is greater among the previously single (unattached and 
filing children) than among the previously common-law, and that the previously single have the 
highest exit rate to common-law unions of all three groups, especially in FQ.  Each of these last 
two observations, however, reflects to a significant degree the low average age of the previously 
single, as multivariate estimates in the next section show that the exit rate to a common-law union 




Estimation Methods and Control Variables  
 
We estimated a competing risk model in which each mother is permitted to exit to any of  
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the four states in Table 1 but we report coefficient estimates only for the exits that we believe to 
be of most interest, namely, exits to marital and common-law unions. Upon exit, the observation 
is censored unless and until a woman starts a new spell of lone motherhood. We use the standard 
logit model specification to estimate the probability of exiting lone motherhood from one year to 
the next as a function of various time-varying personal characteristics and policy variables plus a 
series of dummy variables indicating the current spell length and calendar year.  
1   
The summary statistics in Table A-1 in the Appendix are based on the number of spell-
years in our sample which is the actual unit of observation in our analysis and is therefore much 
larger than the number of spells.  We follow the previous literature in including controls for 
marital status prior to lone motherhood, but note these coefficients must be interpreted cautiously.   
Such coefficients may represent the impact of differences that result from one’s prior marital 
status, such as the accumulation of state-specific human capital, but may also represent 
preferences for living in different types of unions. We leave the separation of these particular 
influences to further research. 
The previous section demonstrated the substantial differences between Francophone 
Quebec and the rest of Canada in the empirical hazard rates to marital and common-law unions.  
The emergence of this difference in marital behaviour would not appear to lie in changes in 
relative socio-economic status given that differences between Francophone Quebec and the rest 
of Canada in levels of education and income have diminished markedly over the past 30 years  
(Corbeil 2003 and Stelcner and Shapiro 1997).  Le Bourdais and Lapierre-Adamcyk (2004) assert 
that two other factors are crucial.  The first was the “Quiet Revolution” in which the citizens of 
Quebec quickly and strongly rejected traditional Catholic teaching in many areas, especially those 
dealing with contraception and family life.   The second is a feminist movement and a  
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commitment to gender equality that are stronger in Quebec than in the rest of Canada, with the 
authors arguing that, on average, there is greater equality among cohabiting couples than among 
married couples. 
The LAD sample is sufficiently large that we can test for differences between language 
groups separately from residence in Quebec.  We do this by including dummy variables to 
identify two language minorities - Anglophones in Quebec and Francophones outside of Quebec.   
Our model also includes two policy-related variables.  The first is a measure of the 
benefits available from social assistance and other government cash transfer programs such as the 
National Child Benefit. The National Council of Welfare has published these amounts annually 
for each province for single parent families with one child and for two parent families with two 
children since 1992 (National Council of Welfare 1992 through 2000). We use these published 
measures as an index of the benefits available to each type of family.  Note that the value of this 
variable reflects legislative parameters, i.e., the amount due a family with no other income rather 
than the actual payment made to any individual family, and is, therefore, exogenous to any given 
individual.  
An increase in welfare benefits for a single parent should, other things equal, decrease the 
likelihood of an exit to marriage (an “independence” effect), whereas greater benefits for a two 
parent family should, other things equal, increase this likelihood.  The provinces generally treat 
common-law unions in the same manner as registered marriages for purposes of welfare benefits 
and, hence, the effect of welfare benefits should be of the same sign for each type of exit.   
Our second policy related variable is the unemployment rate for each of the 70 economic 
regions in the country, the expected impact of which is not clear a priori.   A tighter labor market 
implies better opportunities for economic self-sufficiency for a lone mother, but also a higher  
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level of expected income that a new partner would bring to a marriage or common-law union.   
We also include a series of dummy variables for calendar year.  Most provinces initiated 
welfare policy reforms during the 1990s that comprised reductions in the level of benefits and a 
variety of other policy changes designed to induce a shift from reliance on welfare to earned 
income.  Such changes included more stringent monitoring, “snitch” lines, and a variety of 
opportunities/requirements for training, community service or paid work.  In addition, one of 
goals of the National Child Benefit Supplement (NCBS), introduced in 1998, was to increase the 
returns to paid employment for low income families with children. Neither the NCBS nor most of 
the provincial reforms had the explicit goal of influencing marital behaviour.  However, these 
changes all made welfare less attractive relative to paid work and, historically, an exit from lone 
motherhood to a marital or common-law union has often been accompanied by an exit from 
welfare.  Hence, we include calendar year dummies to capture secular trends in spell duration 
during this period of important changes in welfare policy.  Alberta and Ontario have been among 
the most aggressive jurisdictions in welfare reform and, hence, we estimate some specifications 
with interactions between calendar year and dummies for these two provinces. 
2 
 
Exits to Marriage With Children 
 
Table 2 contains the competing risk model estimates for the likelihood of an exit to marriage for 
Canada as a whole.  The baseline case is for a lone mother who was previously married with 
children and is currently age 25-29 with one child under age 4. She is in her first full year of lone 
motherhood, this is in 1993, and she lives in a city of 500,000 or more inhabitants in Ontario and 
is not a Francophone.  The final column in the first row shows the predicted probability of an exit  
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assuming that the lone mother has the foregoing characteristics, that the unemployment rate is 
7%, and that welfare benefits are $14,000 for a lone parent with one child and $18,000 for a 
couple with two children.   These welfare benefit values were the actual figures for Ontario in 
2000 and the midpoint of the range of values across the ten provinces (National Council of 
Welfare 2002).  The predicted “baseline” probability is 0.13 which is higher than the empirical 
hazard rate of 0.07 for an exit to married in the first spell year in Table 1.  This difference reflects 
baseline characteristics, especially the assumption that prior marital status is married with 
children.    
The remaining values in the final column represent the predicted probability of an exit 
assuming that the lone mother has the same characteristics as the omitted category save for the 
variable in that row.  In the case of the continuous variables, the difference is an increase of one 
percentage point in the unemployment rate and of $1,000 for each of the two welfare benefit 
variables.  In the case of the dummy variables, the difference is a change from a value of 0 to 1 
with one exception;  for the Quebec Anglophone variable, we also assign a value of 1 to the 
dummy for the province of Quebec as is appropriate.     
The province that stands out most clearly from the others is Quebec, which has a 
predicted exit probability of 0.05, or 8 percentage points lower than Ontario and 5 percentage 
points lower than the provinces with the second lowest exit probabilities (Nova Scotia and 
Manitoba).  The minority language dummies indicate that both Anglophones in Quebec and 
Francophones in Ontario have exit probabilities of 0.09.  These values are half-way between the 
exit probabilities for Francophones in Quebec and Anglophones in Ontario and may reflect the 
mixed cultural situation of these language minorities.   
Both LeBourdais et al. and Lefebvre and Merrigan report that previously single lone  
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mothers have higher exit rates than lone mothers who were previously in a marital or common-
law union but neither set of authors could estimate a competing risk model.  In Table 2, those 
lone mothers who were previously married with children have exit rates to being married with 
children that are  five to six percentage points higher than for the previously common-law with 
children, unattached or filing children.  As a sensitivity check, we also estimated the models 
without the dummy variables for marital status prior to lone motherhood. The resulting 
coefficients and standard errors for the other variables (not shown) were very similar to those in 
Tables 2 and 3. 
The coefficient estimates for the policy variables are all very small in magnitude and not 
statistically different from zero. The welfare benefit variables have the expected signs: an 
increase in the benefits available to lone parents decreases the exit probability, and an increase in 
the benefits for couples increases the exit probability.  Due to the colinearity of the two welfare 
benefit variables and the infrequency of welfare benefits among couples, we also estimated a 
specification with only welfare benefits for a lone parent.  The estimated coefficient for lone 
mother welfare benefits was again small in value and had a large p-value.   
The age of the mother has a significant effect, but it is non-monotonic.  Lone mothers 
under 25 (especially under 20) and over 30 (especially over 40) have substantially lower exit 
probabilities than do lone mothers age 25-29.  The coefficients for the number of children 
variable are small and imprecisely estimated which may reflect the fact that more children both 
increase the need for a second income but may make the single parent a less attractive partner. 
Lone mothers with a youngest child age 13 to 17 (i.e., relatively close to adulthood) have an exit 
probability that is 3 percentage points higher than that of mothers with younger children.   
The size of area of residence coefficients imply that exit probabilities are a bit higher in  
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towns under 15,000 and four percentage points higher in rural areas than in large cities.  Our 
principal reason for including these dummies is to control for effects that may be correlated with 
other variables of interest.  For example, most Anglophones in Quebec live in Montreal and a 
large proportion of Francophones outside of Quebec live in smaller communities.   
The predicted probability of an exit declines steadily from 0.13 in year 1 of the lone 
mother spell to about 0.05 beyond year 10.  This rate of decline is very similar to that for the 
empirical hazard rates in Table 1.  The dummies for calendar year imply a modest decline of two 
percentage points during the 1990’s and, hence, provide no evidence that welfare reforms (in 
addition to the benefit levels captured directly) have increased the likelihood of an exit to 
marriage.    Furthermore, when we estimated a model with interactions between calendar year and 
dummy variables for Ontario and Alberta, the interaction coefficients (not shown) were small in 
size and not significantly different from zero. 
We also estimated separate models for NOTFQ and FQ, and in each case the results are 
generally very similar to those for the entire sample.  The main difference, as expected, is that the 
baseline probability of an exit to marriage is much smaller in FQ than in NOTFQ.  For FQ, this 
probability is 0.05 in the first year of a spell and declines to a value of 0.01 by year 10.  For 
NOTFQ, the predicted probability drops from 0.13 to 0.05 over the same period.  Within Quebec 
(or any other single province), the only source of variation in this variable is changes over time 
for a given type of family.  Hence, we cannot disentangle the effects of welfare benefits and 
calendar year using the sample for FQ. The calendar year dummies for both NOTFQ and FQ, 
however, are similar to those for Canada as a whole.  Finally, we also estimated separate models 
by prior marital status and by both language and prior marital status.  In each case, none of the 
above conclusions were altered substantially.   
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Exits to Common-law With Children 
 
Table 3 contains the estimates for the likelihood of an exit to a common-law union. The 
coefficients for most variables in Table 3 differ substantially from those in Table 2, which 
highlights the importance of estimating a competing risk model.  In Table 3, Quebec has the 
highest exit likelihood of any province, as opposed to the lowest likelihood as in Table 2.  Quebec 
has a predicted exit probability of 0.12, which is 5 percentage points higher than Ontario (the 
omitted category in the first row) and 4 percentage points higher than the provinces with the 
second highest exit probabilities (Newfoundland and Alberta).  Anglophones in Quebec have the 
same exit probability as Anglophones in Ontario due to the offsetting effects of the Quebec and 
English in Quebec coefficients.  The coefficient for Francophones outside of Quebec is 
statistically significant but small in magnitude.   
The coefficients for prior marital status are also quite different from those in Table 2. 
Lone mothers who were previously common-law with children have an exit rate to common-law 
that is two to three percentage points higher than the rate for the other groups.  Hence, the results 
from Tables 2 and 3 indicate that the type of lone mother most likely to exit to either a marital or 
common-law union is in each case a lone mother who previously occupied that same type of 
union.   
As in Table 2, the coefficient estimates for the welfare benefits variables are of the 
expected signs but small in magnitude and not statistically different from zero.  This inference is 
again unchanged if only welfare benefits available to a lone mother are included.  The coefficient 
for the unemployment rate is statistically significant and implies that spell length is counter- 
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cyclical (i.e., the exit rate rises when the unemployment rate falls), but the size of the effect is 
small.   
The likelihood of an exit to a commonly law union declines monotonically with the age of 
the mother, unlike the inverted U-shape for exits to marriage.  A larger number of children was 
associated with a higher exit rate to marriage in Table 2 although the effect is small and 
imprecisely estimated.  In contrast, an exit to a common-law union in Table 3 is somewhat less 
likely for women with more children and the effect, though small, is precisely estimated.  The age 
of the youngest child is positively associated with both types of exits but the coefficients are 
larger and more precisely estimated in Table 3 than in Table 2.  In Table 2, only the smallest 
towns and especially rural areas have a statistically different (higher) likelihood of exit to 
marriage than the baseline case (500,000+).  In Table 3, however, all city size categories have a 
higher likelihood of an exit to a common-law union compared to the baseline category.  
The predicted probability of an exit to common-law has a fairly steady value (7%-8%) in 
the first eights years of the spell and declines only a few percentage points thereafter, as was true 
of the empirical hazard in Table 1.  This contrasts sharply with the monotonically declining 
pattern of exits to marriage in Table 2.   
Most of the calendar year dummies are statistically significant and, unlike the declining 
pattern in Table 2, at first increase (algebraically) in size and then become moderately more 
negative again.  As with exits to marriage, however, the most important inference is that the 
estimates provide no indication that the welfare reforms of the 1990’s (nor the other factors 
captured by the year variables) have increased the likelihood of an exit to a common-law union in 
Canada in general.  However, when we estimated a model specification with interactions between 
calendar year and dummy variables for Ontario and Alberta, the interaction coefficients indicate  
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an increase of 1-2 percentage points in the exit rate to common-law unions in these two provinces 
relative to other ones.    
Separate estimates by language group provided few additional insights. The main 
difference between FQ and NOTFQ is the expected one that the exit rate for FQ is six percentage 
points higher (0.13 versus 0.07) than for NOTFQ in the first spell year.  However, this difference 
disappears by spell year 10 due to a decline in the probability for FQ.  Beyond spell year 10, the 
exit rate declines to a value of 0.03 in NOTFQ but there is no clear decrease in FQ.  It should be 
kept in mind, however, that few spells last this long.  The separate models also imply, as did the 
empirical hazard rates in Figures 3 and 4, that FQ and NOTFQ do not differ in terms of the total 
likelihood of an exit to a union of some sort, but rather just in the type of union. The calendar 
year dummies indicate a very modest decline in exit rates in NOTFQ but not in FQ. As with exits 
to marriage, we estimated separate models by prior marital status and by both language and prior 
marital status, but arrived at no conclusions substantially different from those above.   
 
Multivariate Estimates with Income Variables  
 
Education level is not in the LAD.  The LAD, however, does contain detailed data on income 
(and its specific sources), a variable that is highly correlated with education, and we estimate 
some models that include the level of different types of income.  We find that our parameter 
estimates are little changed by the inclusion or exclusion of the individual income variables and 
interpret this finding as indicating that the absence of education variables from our model has not 
significantly biased the other coefficient estimates.  Individual income (earned, private non-
earned and government transfers) is interesting but at least partially endogenous. Hence, we only  
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discuss the estimated income coefficients themselves only briefly and will provide estimates of 
the models that include the income variables upon request.   
Higher levels of employment income and private, non-employment income are associated 
with substantially lower exit probabilities to marriage. For example, the predicted probability of 
an exit to marriage decreases by five percentage points as employment income increases from 
under $20,000 to over $40,000 or as private, non-employment income increases from under 
$1,000 to over $10,000.  Hence, the “financial independence effect” of such income appears to 
outweigh the “attractiveness in the marriage market” effect.  Welfare benefits would generally be 
reduced by the full amount of any new partner’s income and, as expected, the presence of welfare 
income is associated with a decrease of 5 percentage points in the probability of an exit to 
marriage.  The results for exits to a common-law union were similar qualitatively but the 
coefficients were only one-half as large as for exits to marriage. The income coefficients for 
Francophone Quebec were 25%-50% larger (in absolute value) than those in the rest of Canada 
for exits to marriage, and 25%-50% smaller for exits to common-law unions.  
 
Differences in the Economic Consequences of an Exit  
 
In this final section, we briefly consider the economic consequences of an exit from lone 
motherhood for two reasons.  First, the literature indicates that an exit to a union is usually 
accompanied by an increase in income and a reduction in welfare use but there is no information, 
to our knowledge, as to whether or not the type of union makes a difference.  Second, our results 
indicate that Francophones from Quebec, compared to other Canadians, are much less likely to 
exit to marriage and more likely to exit to a common-law union.  Are the economic consequences  
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of an exit different for these language groups?   
Table 4 provides three measures of economic status in both the last full year before the 
exit (T-1) and the first full year after the exit (T+1) for those lone mothers observed to exit to 
either a marital or common-law union.  The measures of economic status are being in low income 
(defined as income below the Statistics Canada Low Income Cutoff), having any welfare income, 
and having any earned income. 
  The top panel shows both the level of, and changes in, these proportions for the sample as 
a whole.  Virtually all of the changes between T-1 and T+1 in the proportion of mothers with 
earned income in Table 4 are small and will receive no further comment.  The decline in the 
proportion of women with low income is large and is slightly larger (29 percentage points versus 
26) for exits to common-law unions than for exits to marriage.  The decline in the proportion with 
welfare income is substantially larger (31 percentage points versus 21) for exits to marriage than 
for exits to common-law unions.  
The lower two panels show these changes for FQ and NOTFQ.   Considering both types 
of exits, the data indicate that the decline in the proportion of women with low income is larger 
(33 percentage points versus 27) in FQ and the decline in the proportion with welfare income is 
larger (25 percentage points versus 19) in NOTFQ.  This result would be predicted by the finding 
in the previous paragraph combined with the fact that exits to common-law unions are more 
common in FQ.  In addition, however, the lower two panels of Table 4 also show that the decline 
in the proportion with low income is larger in FQ for both types of exits and the decline in the 
proportion with welfare income is larger in NOTFQ for both types of exits.     
So does the type of union or language matter for the economic consequences of an exit?  
Table 4 indicates that the answer is no in the case of earned income.  For the other measures, the  
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answer is “yes to some extent”, but the consequences depend on the economic variable 
considered.  Exits to common-law union and both types of exits in FQ are associated with have 
larger declines in the proportion with low income.  Exits to marriage and both types of exits in 
NOTFQ are associated with have larger declines in the proportion with welfare income.  Hence, 
if one considers reductions in the incidence of low income and in the incidence of welfare income 
to be positive outcomes, then our data indicate no clear ranking by either exit state or language 
group.  
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION   
 
  The duration of spells of lone motherhood has important consequences for the economic well 
being of the members of such families and the cost of social programs, especially welfare, but has 
received little recent attention from Canadian researchers.  This paper provides the first estimates 
of which we are aware of the duration of lone motherhood spells in Canada using a competing 
risk model, and data that are longitudinal and cover the welfare policy reforms of the last decade.  
We use a large sample of linked income tax records that covers the period 1982 through 2000.   
Our findings highlight the importance of a competing risk model. The likelihood of an 
exit to marriage starts at a higher level but declines more rapidly with spell duration than does the 
likelihood of an exit to a common-law union.  Furthermore, most other control variables, such as 
length of spell and age of mother, have different impacts on exits to the two different states. We 
find no evidence, however, of a link between the exit rate to either a marital or common-law 
union, and the level of welfare benefits for either lone mothers or two-parent families.  In 
addition, the data do not indicate any secular increase (and usually point to a decrease) in exit  
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rates to one form of union or another (after controlling for welfare benefit levels and other 
explanatory variables) during the period of recent welfare reforms, other than a modest increase 
in exit rates to common-law unions in two provinces, Ontario and Alberta, where such welfare 
reforms were pursued most aggressively.   
Francophones in Quebec have much lower exit rates to marriage and much higher exit 
rates to common-law unions than do other Canadians even when one conditions on marital status 
prior to lone motherhood and other socio-economic characteristics.  We find, however, no 
substantial difference between these language groups in the likelihood of an exit from lone 
motherhood to some form of union.   
Finally, we briefly consider the economics consequences of exits from lone motherhood. 
Such exits lead to only small increases in the proportion of lone mothers with earned income for 
both exit states and language groups.  Exits to common-law unions generally, and in Francophone 
Quebec specifically, are associated with somewhat larger declines in the proportion of families 
with low income than are exits to marriage and in the rest of Canada. In contrast, exits to marital 
unions generally and in the rest of Canada specifically are associated with somewhat larger 
declines in the proportion of families with welfare income than are exits to common-law unions 
and in Francophone Quebec.   
In summary, we find little evidence that the level of welfare benefits or the recent period 
of welfare reforms have had an impact on the duration of lone motherhood spells.  We also find 
little evidence to indicate that the shift from marital to common law unions in Francophone 
Quebec has had a marked impact on the likelihood of exiting lone motherhood or on the overall 
economic repercussions of such an exit.  
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Data Appendix:  Identifying Lone Mothers and Other Family Types 
 
The declared marital status on tax forms refers to the end of the tax year and, prior to 1992, 
offered five possible categories: married, widowed, divorced, separated, and single.  The Income 
Tax Guide made it clear that “married” refers to registered marriages and not common-law 
unions. Starting in 1992, however, the category of “common-law” was added, while the other 
categories remained unchanged.  In constructing the LAD, Statistics Canada first finds a partner 
for all persons with a Declared Marital Status of “married” or, since 1992, “common-law.” This 
is usually a straightforward process, because married individuals (which is how Canadians file 
tax forms) are required to identify their partners (including their Social Insurance Numbers) on 
their forms.  However, a spouse is imputed if he or she has not filed a tax form or a match cannot 
otherwise be made.  The LAD then uses a record matching process to identify persons in 
undeclared CL unions, both prior to and subsequent to 1992, as well as “filing children” who are 
unattached individuals age 18 or more who live with one or both parents and have no dependents.   
This combining of individuals into couples and of parents with their filing children is 
based on algorithms which have been developed at Statistics Canada over many years and which 
use address matches, individuals’ names and ages, and the identification of other individuals 
resident at the same address (if any). Younger (non-filing) children are then identified through the 
pertinent tax deductions, by links with other administrative files, and by other means. 
The common-law family status can be imprecise not just in administrative data, such as 
the LAD, but also in survey data and not infrequently in life itself.  For example, Manning and 
Smock (2003) conducted 90 in-depth interviews with young American men and women with 
recent cohabitation experience. They conclude that cohabitation is a gradual transition across a  
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line that is often quite fuzzy and that, even for the individuals involved, it is not a simple task to 
differentiate between living alone and living with a cohabiting partner.  Their research raises 
questions about the accuracy of survey questions commonly used to identify cohabiting couples.  
For example, the term “unmarried partner” is used in the U.S. Census, Current Population 
Surveys, and Survey of Income and Program Participation to identify cohabiting couple families.  
Manning and Smock’s data suggest that this term is not well understood by many young adults 
who have, in fact, lived with an unmarried partner and do not even think that this term is referring 
to their living arrangement.   
Previous research with the LAD and a desire to limit the impact of classification errors on 
our results led us to impose the following rules for the identification of transitions into a deemed 
valid spell of lone motherhood. The basis for these rules is a 5-year data-window centred on the 
transition year (t) into a spell of lone motherhood. The spell is rejected if any of the following 
was true during this window: 
1.  The woman did not file a tax form in any year (t-2 through t+2).  
2.  The family type of the woman changed more than three times.  
3.  The woman changed spouses more than two times.  
4.  The woman separated from and then reunited with the same spouse during the window and 
failed to declare a marital status of “separated” or “divorced” in the interim.  
5.  The woman was an LP in year t-2 (but not so, of course, in t-1).  
6.  The woman was not an LP in t+1 but was an LP in t+2.  
7.  The woman was in a common-law union in either t-1 or t-2 but not both.  
8.  The woman has children age 18 + but only children age 18+ in year t-1. This applies 
regardless of her marital status in year t-1.  
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9.  The woman was childless in year t-1 and had a child (of any age) in year t-2.  
Rule 1 requires that we have a complete record. Rules 2 through 7 reflect a concern with 
the accuracy of information or even the stability of the actual situation for individuals with very 
frequent changes in family status. Rules 8 and 9 reflect both doubts regarding individuals with 
what appear to be unusual changes in child status and our wish to focus on women with children 
under 18.  Note, however, that a woman might not qualify to enter our sample over one five-year 
window, but do so over another. The application of these rules reduced the number of potential 
spells by approximately 50% with most of the reduction resulting from Rules 1, 5, 6 and 7.  
Subsequent to this reduction, however, the annual number of lone mother families is between 102 
and 110 percent of estimates from survey and census data.  Furthermore, these differences are 
smallest during the 1990’s and that is one more reason why we limited exits from lone 
motherhood to 1993 and beyond. Rule 6 implies that a woman who is not an LP in year T+1 and 
is an LP in year T+2 is not be deemed to have started a valid new spell of lone motherhood. We 
do, however, permit the woman to have a new spell of lone motherhood if she eventually meets 





Bitler, M., J. Belbach, H. Hoynes and M. Zavodny.  2004. “The Impact of Welfare Reform on 
Marriage and Divorce.” Demography, 41, 2:  213-236. 
Corbeil, Jean-Pierre.  2003. “Thurty years of education: Canada's language groups.”  Canadian 
Social Trends, Winter 2003, 71:  8-12. 
Desrosiers, H and C. Le Bourdais. 1993. "La Dynamique de la Monoparentalite Feminine au 
Canada." European Journal of Population, 9: 197-224. 
Dooley, Martin. 1999. “The Evolution of Welfare Participation Among Canadian Lone Mothers 
from 1973 - 1991".  Canadian Journal of Economics, 32,3, 1999: 589-612.   
Dooley, M.,  S. Gascon, P. Lefebvre and P. Merrigan. 2000. “Lone Female Headship and Welfare 
Policy in Canada.” The Journal of Human Resources, 35, 3: 587-602  
Finnie, Ross, Ian Irvine and Roger Sceviour, 2004.  “Welfare Dynamics in Canada: the Role of 
Individual Attributes and Economic/Policy Variables”, Statistics Canada, Analytical 
Studies Research Paper. 
Finnie, Ross and Arthur Sweetman. 2003. “Poverty Dynamics: Empirical Evidence for Canada.” 
Canadian Journal of Economics, 36, 2: 291-325. 
Fitzgerald, John and David Ribar. 2004.  “Welfare Reform and Female Headship.” Demography, 
41, 2:  189-212. 
Gunderson, M. and A. Melino. 1990. “The Effects of Public Policy on Strike Duration” Journal 
of Labor Economics 8, pp. 295-316. 
Ham, J. and S. Rae. 1987. “Unemployment Insurance and Male Unemployment in Canada”, 
Journal of Labor Economics 5, pp. 325-353. 
Juby, H., C. LeBourdais and N. Marcil-Gratton.  2005.  “Moving On:  The Expansion of the  
  29
Family Network After Parents Separate.” Research Report for the Child Support Team of 
the Department of Justice Canada. 
Keifer, N. 1990. “Econometric Methods for Grouped Duration Data”, in Hartog, J., G. Ridder, 
and J. Theeuwes (eds.), Panel Data and Labor Market Studies, Elsevier Science 
Publishers, pp. 97-117. 
Le Bourdais C., H. Desrosiers and B. LaPlante. 1995. "Factors Related to Union Formation 
Among Single Mothers in Canada." Journal of Marriage and the Family, 57: 410-420. 
Le Bourdais, C. and É. Lapierre-Adamcyk (with coll. of P. Pacaut), 2004. “Changes in Conjugal 
Life in Canada – Is Cohabitation Progressively Replacing Marriage  ?”  Journal of 
Marriage and Family,  66, 4.   Forthcoming, November. 
Lefebvre, Pierre and Philip Merrigan. 1997. “Welfare and Conjugal Union Dissolution in Canada: 
A Dynamic Analysis.” Canadian Journal of Economics, XXX, 1: 112-134. 
_____________________________. 1998. “Welfare, Conjugal Unions and Single Motherhood in 
Canada: Estimates from a Hazard Model.” The Journal of Human Resources, 33, 3: 
742-757. 
Manning, Wendy and Pamela J. Smock. 2003. “The Formation of Cohabiting Unions: New 
Perspectives From Qualitative Data.” Working Paper, Center for Family and Demography 
Bowling Green State University.  
Moffitt, Robert.  1994. “Welfare Effects on Female Headship With Area Effects.” The Journal 
of Human Resources, 29, 2: 621-636. 
National Council of Welfare.  2003 through 2002. Welfare Incomes. This series is published 
annually since 1991.  Minister of Public Works and Government Services:  Ottawa.  
  30
National Council of Welfare.  2001.  Child Poverty Profile 1998.  Minister of Public Works and 
Government Services:  Ottawa.  
Picot, G., M. Zyblock and W. Piper. 1999.  “Why do Children Move Into and Out of Low 
Income:  Changing Labour Market Conditions or Marriage and Divorce?”  Working 
Paper,  Analytical Studies Branch, Statistics Canada. 
Statistics Canada.  2004.   Profile of languages in Canada: English, French and many others.   
2001 Census Analysis Series No. 96F0030XIE2001005.   
Stelcner, Morton and Daniel M. Shapiro.  1997.  “Language and Earnings in Quebec: Trends 
over Twenty Years, 1970-1990”,  Canadian Public Policy  23, 2:  115-140. 
                                                 
1 Keifer (1990) shows that the likelihood function for the duration model corresponds to 
that of the standard logit model specification.  Our approach is also employed by Gunderson and 
Melino (1990) for strike durations, by Ham and Rae (1987) for durations of joblessness, and by 
Finnie and Sweetman for spells of low income. 
 
2 See the National Welfare to Work Study (publish.uwo.ca/~pomfret/wtw/) for an extensive 
description of provincial reforms.  U.S. research has found little consistent evidence that recent 
welfare reforms have affected female headship of families (Fitzgerald and Ribar 2004 and  Bitler, 











123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5
Spell Year of Lone Motherhood









123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5
Spell Year of Lone Motherhood
Married With Children Common Law With Children Single No Children Married or CL No ChildrenFigure 3  








123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5
Spell Year of Lone Motherhood
NOTFQ Married NOTFQ Common Law FQ Married FQ Common LawFigure 4









123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5
Spell Year of Lone Motherhood
NOTFQ Married or Common Law FQ Married or Common LawSpell  Married Common Law Married or CL Married Common Law Married or CL
Year With Children With Children With Children With Children With Children With Children
1 0.10 0.04 0.14 0.06 0.06 0.12
2 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.10
3 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.02 0.08 0.10
4 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.02 0.08 0.09
5 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.01 0.08 0.09
6 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.01 0.07 0.08
7 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.06 0.07
8 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.06 0.06
9 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.06
10 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.04
11 0.02 0.03 0.05 * 0.04 0.04
12 0.02 0.03 0.05 * 0.04 0.04
13 0.01 0.03 0.04 * 0.03 0.03
14 0.02 0.02 0.04 * 0.04 0.04
15 * * * * * *
1 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.10
2 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.01 0.10 0.11
3 0.04 0.10 0.14 0.02 0.14 0.15
4 0.03 0.08 0.12 0.01 0.10 0.12
5 0.03 0.08 0.11 0.01 0.10 0.11
6 0.02 0.07 0.09 0.01 0.10 0.11
7 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.01 0.11 0.12
8 0.01 0.06 0.07 * 0.08 0.08
9 0.01 0.04 0.05 * 0.04 0.04
10 * 0.05 0.05 * 0.03 0.03
11 * * * * 0.05 0.05
12 * * * * 0.04 0.04
13 * * * * * *
14 * * * * * *
15 * * * * * *
1 0.07 0.08 0.15 0.04 0.16 0.20
2 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.14 0.17
3 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.02 0.12 0.14
4 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.02 0.12 0.13
5 0.04 0.06 0.11 0.01 0.10 0.11
6 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.11
7 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.01 0.10 0.11
8 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.09
9 0.02 0.05 0.07 * 0.06 0.06
10 0.02 0.04 0.06 * 0.06 0.06
11 0.02 0.04 0.03 * 0.07 0.03
12 0.01 0.04 0.04 * 0.04 0.04
13 * 0.05 0.05 * 0.06 0.06
14 * * * * 0.05 0.05
15 * * * * * *
Sample Size:  450,910 spell years in 89,044 spells
*  Less than 5 exits
Previously Unattached or Filing Child
Table 1
Previously Common Law With Children
Francophone Quebec
Hazard of Exit to
Previously Married With Children
Empirical Hazard Functions By Prior Marital Status
Canada Other Than Francophone QuebecStandard Probability
Coefficient Error P-value of Exit
Intercept -1.78 0.15 0.00 0.13
Province:
Newfoundland 0.09 0.09 0.30 0.14
PEI 0.07 0.11 0.52 0.14
Nova Scotia -0.20 0.05 0.00 0.11
New Brunswick -0.02 0.07 0.74 0.13
Quebec -1.11 0.05 0.00 0.05
Manitoba -0.30 0.09 0.00 0.1
Saskatchewan -0.12 0.06 0.05 0.12
Alberta -0.12 0.08 0.11 0.12
British Columbia -0.16 0.03 0.00 0.11
Minority Language Group:
English in Quebec 0.72 0.06 0.00 0.09
French Outside Quebec -0.43 0.09 0.00 0.09
Pre-Lone Mother Marital Status:
Single, childless -0.59 0.03 0.00 0.08
Married or Common Law, childless 0.12 0.05 0.02 0.15
Filing Child -0.49 0.04 0.00 0.08
Common Law with child -0.75 0.03 0.00 0.07
Policy Variables:
Unemployment Rate 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.13
Welfare benefit:  Single parent -0.03 0.03 0.31 0.13
Welfare benefit:  Couple 0.01 0.02 0.47 0.13
Age of Mother:
Under 20 -0.42 0.14 0.00 0.09
20 through 24 -0.13 0.03 0.00 0.12
30 through 34 -0.25 0.02 0.00 0.1
35 through 39 -0.50 0.03 0.00 0.08
40 through 44 -0.79 0.03 0.00 0.06
45 through 54 -1.00 0.04 0.00 0.05
Number of Children:
Two  0.03 0.02 0.11 0.13
Three 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.14
Four 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.14
Five or more 0.11 0.07 0.09 0.14
Age of Youngest Child:
4 through 7 0.00 0.02 0.88 0.13
8 through 13 0.02 0.03 0.53 0.13
14 through 18 0.23 0.04 0.00 0.16
Table 2
Competing Risks of Exit to Status of Married with Children Under 18Population Size of Area
100,000-499,999 -0.01 0.02 0.82 0.13
30,000-99,999 -0.03 0.03 0.28 0.13
15,000-29,999 -0.01 0.05 0.87 0.13
<15,000 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.14
Rural 0.29 0.03 0.00 0.17
Year of Lone Mother Spell:
2 -0.24 0.02 0.00 0.11
3 -0.24 0.02 0.00 0.11
4 -0.39 0.03 0.00 0.09
5 -0.48 0.03 0.00 0.09
6 -0.64 0.04 0.00 0.07
7 -0.70 0.05 0.00 0.07
8 -0.81 0.05 0.00 0.06
9 -0.97 0.07 0.00 0.05
10 -1.10 0.09 0.00 0.05
11 -1.00 0.10 0.00 0.05
12 -1.09 0.14 0.00 0.05
13 -1.72 0.24 0.00 0.03
14 -1.07 0.25 0.00 0.05
15 -1.21 0.46 0.01 0.04
Calendar Year:
1994 -0.04 0.03 0.23 0.13
1995 -0.07 0.03 0.02 0.12
1996 -0.08 0.03 0.01 0.12
1997 -0.19 0.04 0.00 0.11
1998 -0.24 0.04 0.00 0.11
1999 -0.19 0.04 0.00 0.11
Number of spell-years with an exit 17095
Number of spell-years without an exit 386085
Total number of spell-years 403180
Table 2 (continued)Standard Probability
Coefficient Error P-value of Exit
Intercept -2.65 0.13 0.00 0.07
Province:
Newfoundland 0.15 0.07 0.04 0.08
PEI -0.32 0.11 0.00 0.05
Nova Scotia -0.23 0.05 0.00 0.05
New Brunswick -0.02 0.06 0.72 0.06
Quebec 0.61 0.04 0.00 0.12
Manitoba 0.10 0.08 0.19 0.07
Saskatchewan -0.07 0.05 0.18 0.06
Alberta 0.18 0.07 0.00 0.08
British Columbia 0.00 0.03 0.88 0.07
Minority Language Group:
English in Quebec -0.52 0.05 0.00 0.07
French Outside Quebec 0.13 0.07 0.05 0.07
Pre-Lone Mother Marital Status:
Single, childless -0.02 0.02 0.50 0.07
Married or Common Law, childless -0.06 0.05 0.24 0.06
Filing Child -0.18 0.03 0.00 0.06
Common Law with child 0.24 0.02 0.00 0.08
Policy Variables:
Unemployment Rate -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.07
Welfare benefit:  Single parent -0.01 0.02 0.73 0.07
Welfare benefit:  Couple 0.01 0.02 0.44 0.07
Age of Mother:
Under 20 0.24 0.09 0.01 0.08
20 through 24 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.07
30 through 34 -0.24 0.02 0.00 0.05
35 through 39 -0.57 0.02 0.00 0.04
40 through 44 -0.99 0.03 0.00 0.03
45 through 54 -1.48 0.04 0.00 0.02
Number of Children:
Two -0.04 0.02 0.01 0.06
Three -0.15 0.02 0.00 0.06
Four -0.21 0.04 0.00 0.05
Five or more -0.24 0.06 0.00 0.05
Age of Youngest Child:
4 through 7 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.07
8 through 13 0.15 0.02 0.00 0.08
14 through 18 0.48 0.03 0.00 0.1
Competing Risks of Exit to Status of Common Law Union with Children Under 18
Table 3Population Size of Area 0.00 0.00 0.00
100,000-499,999 0.20 0.02 0.00 0.08
30,000-99,999 0.25 0.02 0.00 0.08
15,000-29,999 0.28 0.04 0.00 0.09
<15,000 0.28 0.02 0.00 0.09
Rural 0.36 0.02 0.00 0.09
Year of Lone Mother Spell:
2 0.12 0.02 0.00 0.07
3 0.24 0.02 0.00 0.08
4 0.20 0.02 0.00 0.08
5 0.13 0.03 0.00 0.07
6 0.13 0.03 0.00 0.07
7 0.04 0.03 0.27 0.07
8 0.00 0.04 0.94 0.07
9 -0.09 0.05 0.04 0.06
10 -0.19 0.06 0.00 0.05
11 -0.17 0.07 0.01 0.06
12 -0.23 0.09 0.01 0.05
13 -0.14 0.11 0.21 0.06
14 -0.47 0.18 0.01 0.04
15 -0.32 0.29 0.27 0.05
Calendar Year:
1994 -0.19 0.03 0.00 0.06
1995 -0.12 0.03 0.00 0.06
1996 0.01 0.03 0.66 0.07
1997 -0.07 0.03 0.01 0.06
1998 -0.09 0.03 0.00 0.06
1999 -0.08 0.03 0.01 0.06
Number of spell-years with an exit 27730
Number of spell-years without an exit 386085
Total number of spell-years 413815
Table 3 (continued)% Low % Welfare % Earned  % Low % Welfare % Earned  % Low % Welfare % Earned 
Income Income Income Income Income Income Income Income Income
T-1 0.45 0.38 0.68 0.45 0.37 0.66 0.45 0.38 0.68
T+1 0.16 0.13 0.71 0.19 0.06 0.69 0.16 0.17 0.72
Change -0.29 -0.25 0.03 -0.26 -0.31 0.03 -0.29 -0.21 0.04
T-1 0.44 0.39 0.67 0.45 0.37 0.67 0.44 0.42 0.68
T+1 0.17 0.14 0.701 0.19 0.06 0.7 0.15 0.18 0.71
Change -0.27 -0.25 0.03 -0.26 -0.31 0.03 -0.29 -0.24 0.03
T-1 0.48 0.32 0.69 0.53 0.35 0.61 0.47 0.32 0.7
T+1 0.15 0.13 0.72 0.21 0.09 0.64 0.14 0.14 0.74
Change -0.33 -0.19 0.03 -0.32 -0.26 0.03 -0.33 -0.18 0.04
Francophone Quebec
and Proportion of Lone Mothers with Earned Income in Year Prior to (T-1)
Sample Size:  17,095 exits to marriage and 27,730 exits to a common law union
Canada Other Than Francophone Quebec
Table 4
Proportions of Mothers in Families with Low Income and with Welfare Income
and Year Following (T+1) an Exit to a Marital or Common Law Union
Exits to Common Law
Canada
Exits to Marriage or Common Law Exits to MarriagePre-Lone Mother Marital Status Count %
Single, childless 54,815 12.1
Married with Children 287,270 63.3
Married or Common Law, childless 8,270 1.8
Filing Child 25,515 5.6
Common Law with Children 78,010 17.2
453,880
Age of Mother
Under 20 1,600 0.4
20 through 24 35,285 7.8
25 through 29 70,160 15.5
30 through 34 103,915 23.0
35 through 39 114,280 25.3
40 through 44 83,140 18.4







Five or more 6,305 1.4
453,870
Age of Youngest Child
0 through 3 125,050 27.6
4 through 7 97,000 21.4
8 through 13 172,530 38.0













Nova Scotia 18,145 4.0






British Columbia 55,670 12.3
453,815
Summary Statistics for Independent Variables in Duration Models*
Table A-1
N.B. The statistics below refer to spell-years which are much more numerousr than spells.  Minority Language Status
English in Quebec 11,190 2.5
French Outside Quebec 4,735 1.0
Employment Income of Mother






> $50,000 24,560 5.4
451,485
Private Nonemployment Income of Mother
< $1,000 295,400 65.7
$1,000-$5,000 78,260 17.4
$5,000-$10,000 43,985 9.8
> $10,000 31,830 7.1
449,475
Presence of Welfare Income
Welfare Income 181,485 40.0
No Welfare Income 272,390 60.0
453,875
Sample Size:  453,875 spell years across 93,730 spells
*Totals vary slighly due to minor variation in missing values.
Table A-1 (continued)